Abstract: The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), the main promoter of the political power, have four times required that as to ECFA they should resort to referendum, which panoramically displays the operating mechanism of “referendum law” in Taiwan. The series of lawsuits triggered by the ECFA referendum have clarified the doubtful points in the proposal review authority, review standards and procedures in the Referendum Review Commission (RRC), and for the first time, established the “referendum” standard space and its limitation. On the other hand, the judicial authority's harsh requirement on the due process from RRC offers a sharp contrast with its loose and even indulgent stance on the review of the substantive issues. Admittedly, such methodadopted by the RRC embodies the political wisdom of the judicial authority, and may seemingly help RRC to filter the unqualified referendum proposals. On contrary, it has essentially abandoned the “safety valve” of the “referendum” legitimacy identified by the judicial authority.
Key Words: ECFA, referendum, cross-Strait agreement, judicial review